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Abstract
We scrutinize the impact of international productivity gains (spillovers) induced by
imports and exports on optimal taris. First, we solve a stylized 2x2 trade model of
a large open economy and show that (a) productivity gains via exports and imports
both reduce the strategically optimal tari, (b) there exists a certain strength of pro-
ductivity gains such that the incentive to manipulate the terms of trade strategically
vanishes, (c) the welfare gain that can be achieved via a tari is lower in the presence
of productivity gains than in their absence, and (d) these results even hold without
power on international markets. Second, we apply this model to a panel data set
covering 40 countries, 29 sectors and the years 1995 to 2009. We nd that import-
driven productivity gains are stronger than export-driven productivity gains. Third,
we extend our 2x2 model to a multi-region, multi-sector model that we calibrate to
the data set used in the econometric analysis and to the econometrically estimated
productivity gains. Optimal taris are reduced by 17% for the US and China and
40% for Brazil when taking trade-induced productivity gains into account. The USA
are the only model region that gains from European optimal tari policy. Thus,
trade-induced productivity gains have empirically relevant eects on optimal taris.
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1 Introduction
Nations do not only benet from international trade by specializing according to their
competitive advantages or by exploiting economies of scale. If knowledge and ideas are
embodied in traded goods, openness to trade will also provide access to knowledge stocks
abroad (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). International exchange of goods and services also
implicates more competition and more ecient production (Melitz, 2003). Nations enjoy
spillovers boosting their productivity when they open up to trade. Embodied technology
spillovers generate a positive externality of trade.
If a country exhibits power on international markets, it will be able to increase domestic
welfare by erecting trade barriers and thereby manipulating terms of trade. Surprisingly,
it has not yet been investigated how the incentives for strategic trade policy are altered
in the presence of trade-induced productivity gains, in particular embodied technology
spillovers. This paper lls this gap, both qualitatively and quantitatively. It sets up
and solves a theoretical model; it estimates trade-related productivity gains based on this
model econometrically; and it applies the estimates to a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model. It is a main contribution to the literature that we design these three
methodological parts in a monolithic way such that all parts build on the same basic
model.
The theoretical analysis highlights that setting a tari without taking international
productivity spillovers into account will fail to achieve the welfare optimum. It proves that
productivity gains through imports and exports reduce the optimal tari. If spillovers are
strong enough compared to a country's market power, they can oset the incentive to abuse
that power completely. Unlike in the model by Markusen (1975), power on international
markets is not a prerequisite for productivity spillovers to be policy-relevant. The trade-
induced productivity increasing externality occurs in the home country so that there is
no need to manipulate international prices to internalize it.
Unlike the existing literature, the econometric estimations utilize the same novel data
set as the computational part: the World Input-Output Database (cf. Dietzenbacher et
al., 2013) providing bilateral and bisectoral production, consumption and trade data for
40 countries and 35 sectors for the years 1995 to 2009. Hence, as an improvement of the
literature, all parts, theory, econometrics and numerical modeling, are built in a consistent
fashion. The focus of our analysis is on the numerical modeling part.
The econometric analysis approves that import- as well as export-related productivity
gains exist and shows that import-induced productivity gains are larger than export-
2
induced ones. Implementing the theoretical and econometric ndings in the numerical
model application illustrates their policy-relevance. Optimal taris are reduced by a range
between 17% for the US and China and 40% for Brazil when taking trade-induced produc-
tivity gains into account. Note that we only simulate spillovers from one year to another.
Long-run productivity eects would be greater, further strengthen their importance.
We nd higher optimal taris for China, India and the United States of America (USA)
than for Europe. Productivity gains via trade are also meaningful for the competitiveness
of European producers. Sectoral losses due to optimal taris across Europe show great
diversity. Herein, the impact of trade-induced productivity gains is signicant. The
insights of this paper are policy-relevant, in particular in the light of real-world trade
policy like the currently debated European Union - United States of America free trade
agreement.
Our analysis refers to the optimal tari literature which has a long tradition. Johnson
(1954) demonstrates in a two-by-two model that under certain conditions a country will
gain from imposing an strategic optimal tari. Hamilton and Whalley (1983) highlight
that in reality taris are "some distance from optimal taris" and that there is potential for
making use of strategic optimal taris. They arm that import price elasticities are crucial
for setting optimal taris. Referring to the political economy literature, Mayer (1984)
notes that "political decisions on tari rates are reections of the selsh economic interests
of voters, lobbying groups, politicians, or other decision makers in trade policy matters".
Gros (1987) suggests (drawing upon Krugman, 1980) that the optimal ad valorem tari
is an increasing function of the economy size and product dierentiation. Kennan and
Riezman (1988) claim that especially large open economies are able to manipulate the
terms of trade in their favor. Brown (1987) argues that an Armington (1969) trade
specication creates a strong terms-of-trade eect independent of country size so that
even small countries will choose non-zero optimal taris. Brown (1987) shows that the
terms-of-trade eect will vanish if the elasticity of substitution between imported varieties
or imported varieties and the domestically produced variety becomes innite. Kennan and
Riezman (1990) exhibit that by imposing optimal taris, members of custom unions can
become better o than under free trade. Broda et al. (2008) argue that, given power
on international markets, "countries set import taris nine percentage points higher on
inelastically supplied imports relative to those supplied elastically." Their results underline
the policy relevance of optimal tari literature.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 sets up and analyzes the theoretical frame-
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work. Section 3 explains the econometric strategy derived from the theoretical framework
and the results. This illuminates the magnitude of the theoretical eects. Section 4 applies
the theoretical framework and the estimated parameter values to a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model. This illuminates the policy relevance of the theoretical eects.
Section 5 concludes with policy implications.
2 Theoretical framework
This section sets up and analyzes our theoretical framework. We draw upon Markusen's
(1975) general equilibrium two-by-two trade model in the modied version by Jakob et
al. (2013). This theoretical model describes trade policy in the presence of a negative
transboundary, environmental externality. The home country wishes to inuence foreign
country's producers so that their impact on the home country via the transboundary
externality is attenuated. The means to inuence foreign producers' behavior is manipu-
lating the terms of trade. When the home country imposes a higher tari on its imports
from the foreign country, foreign producers will produce less for the export market so that
the externality will be mitigated.
Dierent to Markusen (1975) and Jakob et al. (2013), we do not implement a negative
environmental externality of trade, but a positive productivity externality of trade. The
positive productivity externality is associated with imports as well as exports. First,
the positive externality can emerge through international technology spillovers. A broad
literature stream (summarized by Saggi, 2002; Keller, 2004) has identied imports as a
source of international technology spillovers. Imports embody advanced knowledge that
can be exploited, and imports are often associated with international enterprises that
exchange knowledge between their aliates. Knowledge can further spill over from foreign
aliates to local rms. Second, the positive externality can emerge through increased
competition and rm selection through exporting as described by Melitz (2003)1 and
the vast literature based on this seminal contribution. In particular, Felbermayr et al.
(2013) analyze strategic trade policy in a Melitz model. In their model, the optimal tari
addresses a mark-up distortion, an entry distortion and a terms-of-trade externality. Our
work is, however, more general by looking at export- as well as import-related productivity
gains and by addressing a technology spillover externality, which creates additional eects.
1In the Melitz model of heterogeneous rms, trade liberalization induces the exit of low-productivity
rms and the expansion of the prots and the market share of high-productivity exporting rms. This
reallocation across rms raises overall productivity and welfare.
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The following subsections set up and solve our basic model.
2.1 Model setup
Let us assume a large open economy called Home producing two tradable goods, X and
Y . We further assume that goods X and Y are produced by one representative rm per
sector. Each representative rm characterizes the behavior of a large number of atomistic
rms in the sector. Therefore, rms cannot exploit market power in terms of price setting
on national or international markets. We dene p0 = p
Y
pX
as the domestic price for good
Y relative to good X. Dening X as the numeraire with pX = 1 results in p0 = pY . We
do not model the rest of the world and its behavior or reaction explicitly. We restrict the
analysis to unilateral trade policy.
Home's production pattern depends upon p0 and can be characterized by the following
concave, decreasing production possibility frontier:
QX = T (QY ); TQY < 0; TQY QY < 0 (1)
Q denotes produced quantities. In general, quantities are measured in constant currency
values throughout the paper. T determines the output of X that can be generated when
producing a certain quantity of Y . One can imagine that the exogenously given quantity
of production factors (resources) limits total production of X and Y .
Home's consumption pattern also depends upon p0 and can be characterized by the
following concave, increasing utility function:
U(CX ; CY ); UCX > 0; UCY > 0; UCXCX < 0; UCY CY < 0 (2)
CX and CY denote consumed quantities and hence demand.
Home's trade pattern can be described as follows. Let us without loss of generality
assume that Home is a net exporter of X and a net importer of Y . We assume a balanced
trade budget closure so that the following condition holds:
EX = pMY (3)
E denotes exports, whereas M denotes imports. International prices are expressed as
p = p
Y 
pX . In general p
 diers from the domestic price ratio p0. Home's terms of trade
improve when p declines. The following expressions characterize the inuence of Home's
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exports and imports and international prices:
pMY > 0; p

EX > 0 (4)
A lower index represents a derivative with respect to the corresponding variable through-
out the paper. Higher imports into Home raise the world market demand for Y and hence
the relative price for Y , signied by p. Conversely, higher exports from Home raise the
world market supply of X and hence again p.
Let us introduce a time index t that encompasses two periods f1; 2g. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that knowledge spillovers only occur in the rst period t = 1,
whereas they are realized in the second period t = 2. This takes into account that
technology diusion processes require time. Second-period trade and its growth eects
are not relevant for this analysis and hence not taken into account. Second-period output
proportionately relates to rst-period output in the following fashion:
QX2 =

1 + 0 + E E
X1
QX1

QX1 (5)
QY 2 =

1 + 0 + M M
Y 1
QY 1

QY 1 (6)
0 captures exogenous growth, raising the eciency of production equally for both X
and Y . This corresponds to an proportionate outward shift of the production possibility
frontier by the factor 0 without sector bias. The focus of our analysis is on trade-related
productivity growth. We assume that trade-related growth adds to exogenous growth and
is strictly separable from exogenous growth. This assumption implies that the choice of
the production point (the shares of X and Y production in total production) in the second
period equal those of the rst period, while total quantities are multiplied by 0.
Trade-induced productivity gains add to this second-period production unexpectedly
in the second step without aecting the production point of the production possibility
frontier. This implies, producers do not internalize the productivity gains from trade.
Hence, producers' choice of relative X and Y production in any period is not aected by
trade-induced productivity gains without policy intervention. To model the unanticipated
externality, we assume that productivity gains in period 2 depend on Home's export and
import intensity (measured relative to production) in period 1. We assume that the
externality is sector-specic so that a higher export intensity in the X sector expands
second-period X production. E governs the strength of export-induced productivity
gains, which are supposed to capture Melitz-type rm selection eects, productivity gains
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from competition on export markets and possibly technology spillovers through contact
with trading partners, although technology spillovers are mainly expected from importing.
A higher import intensity expands second-period Y production in the analog way. M
governs the strength of import-induced productivity gains, which are supposed to capture
technology spillovers and productivity gains from competition on import markets. In this
stylized typical two-by-two trade model with homogeneous products, though, each sector
is either a net exporter (here X) or a net importer (here Y ). This simplication will again
be relaxed in the econometric estimation and in the numerical model calibration in order
to t theory to real-world data. Formally, we write sectoral second-period production QX2
and QY 2 as a function of rst-period export intensity E
X1
QX1
and import intensity M
Y 1
QY 1
. We
employ the intensity form to make spillovers independent of sector size.
2.2 Closed-form solution
We are now able to phrase and solve Home's two-period utility maximization problem:
max
fQY 1;QY 2;MY 1;MY 2;EX1;EX2g
W; W = U1 + U2 (7)
We insert Equations (1) to (6). Moreover, we assume that there is no change in consumer
preferences so that the second-period utility function equals the rst-period function. We
impose a balanced budget condition given by (3) on rst-period trade. The total output
of each good is fully absorbed. We drop the time index, assuming that all variables
refer to period 1. Using (3), we can write the international price ratio p as a function
of MY . Note that we only look at rst-period trade like in a static one-period trade-
model. By assumption, no induced spillovers occur in the second period. Therefore, the
second period reverts to the standard case of the optimal tari model. We refrain from
displaying Home's optimal trade pattern in the second period to focus our analysis on the
spillover-related eects in the rst period. We recall that the exogenous part of technical
progress governed by 0 shifts the production possibility frontier T (QY ) outward so that
X and Y production expand by the same factor 0. Trade-induced productivity gains,
on the contrary, are sector-specic and add to the exogenous expansion of the production
possibility frontier independently. We recall that rms do not anticipate trade-induced
spillovers, or in other words productivity gains, and thus do not take them into account in
their calculus. The second-period distribution of production to the X- and the Y -sector is
therefore unaected by the existence of the trade-induced spillovers. Since all production is
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absorbed by the consumer of the home country and we do not look at second-period trade,
both, the exogenously and the endogenously created additional second-period production
directly add to consumption. Since the utility function does not change across periods
and everything else stays constant across periods, we can subsume rst- and second-period
consumption within one consumption function with the arguments X and Y consumption.
For the sake of brevity, we do not discount utility. Based on these considerations, we
obtain the following maximization problem with rst-period Y production and rst-period
imports M as the only control variables:2
max
fQY ;MY g
W; W = U

T (QY ) MY  p(MY ); QY +MY 
+U

(1 + 0)T (QY ) + EMY  p(MY ); (1 + 0)QY + MMY  (8)
By executing @W
@QY
= 0 and @W
@MY
= 0, we obtain the rst-order conditions:
(2 + 0)UCY + (2 + 
0)TQY UCX = 0 (9)
(1 + M )UCY   (1  E)(p +MY  pMY )UCX = 0 (10)
A lower index indicates a rst derivative with respect to this variable. We recall from
basic micro-economic theory that a consumer achieves maximum utility when the ratio of
marginal utilities (the marginal rate of substitution) equals the corresponding consumer
price ratio q0:
q0 =
qY
qX
=
UCY
UCX
(11)
We also recall that producers earn maximum prots when the ratio of marginal produc-
tivities (the technical rate of substitution) equals the corresponding producer price ratio
with inverse sign:
p0 =  TQY (12)
2Note that the trade- induced productivity gains, EMY  p(MY ) in the X-sector and MMY in the
Y -sector, are independent of rst-period production quantities Q. (Q cancels out in the trade-induced
terms in Equations 5 and 6.) They solely depend on rst-period import and export quantities and the
related strengths of productivity gains (spillovers).
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Rearranging (9) and (10) and inserting (11) and (12) yields:
q0 = p0 (13)
q0 = (p +MY  pMY| {z }
strat
)  1  
E
1 + M| {z }
prod
(14)
The rst equation simply arms that in the optimum, Home's consumer price equals the
producer price. This means, production is unaected by the existence of trade-induced
productivity gains as specied in Equation (5) and (6). The second equation arms that
the optimal tari drives a wedge between the international price and Home's consumer
price. strat is the well-known strategic term: by imposing a tari at the rate strat =
MY  p
MY
in addition to the international price, Home optimally exploits its power on
international markets.3 A higher p
MY
implies a stronger reaction of the world market
price to changes in Home's imports (and exports). As a consequence, Home's optimal
tari rises in order to exploit the market power increasing in p
MY
.
Proposition 1. In the presence of trade-induced productivity gains, there is an incentive
to expand trade even without market power on international markets (when the home
country is a small open economy). The potential for expanding trade with the aim to
exploit trade-induced productivity gains increases in international market power.
Proof. Consider Equation (14) for a small open economy. Without market power
on international markets, p
MY
is zero. Hence, the possibility to manipulate the terms
of trade (strat) vanishes. The incentive to internalize the productivity eect of trade
is nevertheless present, represented by the last term (prod). Home attempts to export
and import more in order to exploit the trade-induced productivity gains (technology
spillovers) that occur within its boundaries. If international prices stay constant and
cannot be inuenced by Home, Home can nevertheless inuence domestic prices relative
to the constant international prices. This mechanism diers from Markusen (1975), where
the environmental externality occurs abroad and Home requires market power to mitigate
the environmental externality in the foreign country by inuencing international prices.
Hence, in Markusen's model, it is necessary that the home country is a large open economy.
In our model, on the contrary, the externality occurs within the home country so that the
ability to internalize it does not depend on power on international markets. This result also
3The import-dependency of the international price creates a term that is typical for a maximization
problem with monopoly power, in this case MY  p(MY ) in equation (8).
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diers from Brown (1987), where no externality is taken into account so that the terms-
of-trade eect will vanish, when traded commodities become perfectly substitutable, i.e.
when market power disappears.
Nevertheless, the potential for expanding the externality in absolute terms increases
in power on international markets. This can easily be seen in Equation (14). The
productivity-related term (strat) reduces any given price wedge in relative terms, i.e.
by a factor prod < 1. In absolute terms, the eect depends upon the magnitude of
p+MY  pMY| {z }
strat
. Since p
MY
rises in Home's market power, prod's absolute eect also rises
in Home's market power. The intuition is that with higher market power, Home has a
higher potential for boosting trade by manipulating international prices so that foreign
producers intend to enhance trade with Home.
Proposition 2. Productivity gains through imports and exports reduce the optimal tari
that manipulates the terms of trade in favor of a large open economy.
Proof. In Equation (14), strat attenuates the price for Y imports and elevates the price
for X exports relative to each other. This improves the terms of trade in Home's favor but
hampers trade in absolute volumes. Stronger productivity gains via exports, expressed
by E , or stronger productivity gains via imports, expressed by M , both contradict the
eect of strat. This converse eect of productivity gains from trade on the terms of
trade is summarized by prod. prod < 1 has the form of an ad-valorem subsidy that
multiplies the world market price plus the strategic tari by a factor smaller than one.
The intuition is simple: the strategic term improves the international price in Home's
favor, but diminishes import and export volumes. Home, on the contrary, attempts to
expand import and export volumes in the presence of productivity gains in order to better
exploit them.
Proposition 3. For every world market price, there exists a certain strength of produc-
tivity gains through imports and exports such that the incentive to manipulate the terms
of trade vanishes.
Proof. Solving Equation (14) in the form p = q0 = (p +MY  p
MY
)  1 E
1+M
yields:
p  (M   E) =MY  pMY  (1  E) (15)
If this condition is fullled, there will be no dierence between the original world market
price p and the one manipulated via Home's optimal tari. The incentive for beggar-
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thy-neighbor policies is perfectly oset by the incentive to internalize the productivity
spillovers.
Proposition 4. The welfare gain for a large open economy achieved via a given tari rate
is lower in the presence of productivity gains through imports and exports than in their
absence.
Proof. More potent market power expressed by a higher p
MY
, i.e. a stronger impact of
Home's imports on international prices, magnies the potential for welfare gains through
the manipulation of international prices. In Equation (8), a reduction in imports MY
reduces consumption CY , which is detrimental for Home, and simultaneously reduces ex-
ports valued by international prices MY  p(MY ), which raises consumption CX , which
is benecial. The more potent Home's market power is, the stronger the latter benecial
eect is. As a consequence, the welfare gain that can be achieved by compressing imports
is higher under more potent market power. It is obvious in Equation (14) that the pro-
ductivity gain factor prod reduces p
MY
and hence the eective market power and thus
counteracts the use of strategic taris. This in turn attenuates the welfare gain generated
by a tari (the optimal tari or any other tari).
The following Section 3 nds evidence for the existence of the productivity gains driv-
ing the propositions. Section 4 validates these propositions in a more complex numerical
model.
3 Econometric estimation
This section estimates the coecients governing the strength of import- and export-driven
productivity gains. Our econometric analysis builds upon a vast literature stream on
trade-related international productivity (technology) spillovers as summarized by Saggi
(2002), Keller (2004) and Havranek and Irsova (2011) (cf. Coe and Helpman, 1995, and
Coe et al., 1997, for seminal papers on North-South productivity spillovers). Although the
results of this literature are diverse and ambiguous, the bottom-line is that trade-induced
(and more signicantly foreign direct investment-induced) international productivity gains
do exist. Other than to these studies, we contrast import-induced with export-induced
productivity gains. The latter endeavor follows the literature that seeks for Melitz (2003)
type of productivity gains from rm selection. Girma et al. (2004), for example, nd
for manufacturing rms in the United Kingdom that exporters are more productive than
other rms and become even more productive through exporting. The contribution of our
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econometric analysis is to compare import- and export-related productivity gains at the
country and sector level within a large global data set. Our econometric analysis itself
is, however, mainly an intermediate step that proves the validity of the theoretical model
(of section 2) and provides the parameter values for the numerical implementation (in
section 4). We abstain from including control variables (besides xed-eects) because we
make the estimations as consistent as possible with the numerical model implementation
described in the following section. The numerical implementation does not allow us to
include control variables since they are not implemented in the model. As a consequence,
it is less detailed than fully-edged econometric analyzes that infer their implications
solely from the econometric results based on various tests, regressions and robustness
checks. Such a detailed econometric analysis is beyond the scope of this model analysis.
Consequently, direct policy inference from our econometric analysis requires some caution
and an interpretation in the context of the existing literature. The following subsections
derive the econometric estimation from the theoretical model and interpret the estimation
results.
3.1 Model setup
This subsection derives the econometric model from the framework set up in the previous
section. Equations (5) and (6) implicitly assume that output expands while total input
stays constant. Let now input Z, which captures all inputs of production factors as
well as intermediate goods, enter the equation explicitly. Furthermore, let us generalize
the model to s sectors. In order to t the model to real-world data, the assumption
that each sector produces a homogeneous good which is either imported or exported is
dropped. Instead, we take into account that in reality products of sector s can both be
imported and exported. This requires the existence of varieties of each good produced
in dierent countries. For this purpose, we also introduce a region index r describing
a number of countries. Each sector in each region exports and imports one good (one
commodity). Imports to one region and sector are aggregated over all other exporting
regions. Likewise, exports of a country and sector are imported by any other region. In
addition, let t denote time, or more specically, a number of years. Then, the generalized
combination of Equations (5) and (6) results in the following equation for each sector:
Qrst+1
Zrst+1
=

1 + 0r + M
M rst
Qrst
+ E
Erst
Qrst

 Q
rst
Zrst
(16)
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The exogenous growth factor 0r is region-specic. The trade-related growth factors M
and E are assumed to be identical in all sectors and regions. Q
rst
Zrst can be interpreted as
total factor productivity (TFP).4 This means, the above equation describes total factor
productivity growth. It describes the growth rate of Q
rst+1
Zrst+1
and can therefore be rewritten
in dlog form. 0r can be interpreted as country xed-eects. Adding an error term rst
that captures deviations not explained by the model yields:
d log

Qrst+1
Zrst+1

= 0r + M
M rst
Qrst
+ E
Erst
Qrst
+ rst (17)
We estimate this equation using the novel World Input Output Database (WIOD)5 panel
data for 40 countries6, 29 sectors7 and the years 1995 to 2009. It is to our knowledge
the rst database providing bilateral and bisectoral input-output relations and various
socio-economic and environmental indicators for a sequence of years within one consistent
data set.
The growth of total factor productivity is computed with the help of the production
function dened by Equation (19). The equation depicts the constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) nesting structure that will be used in the numerical model. It is assumed
that technical progress only aects total factor productivity, while optimal input shares
of factors remain constant. Inputs of labor and energy, measured in physical units (mil-
lion hours worked, Terajoule), are also taken from the WIOD database. All quantities
4Setting Zrst+1 = Zrst and multiplying by Zrst on both sides leads back to Equations (5) and (6).
5The WIOD project has been funded by the European Commission, Directorate General Research, as
part of the 7th Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities. WIOD has
been available for the public since April 2012. See Timmer, M.P. (2012, ed.), The World Input-Output
Database (WIOD): Contents, Sources and Methods. http://www.wiod.org/database/.
6Australia (ROW), Austria (EUR), Belgium (EUR), Canada (ROW), Czech Republic (EUR), Denmark
(EUR), Estonia (EUR), Finland (EUR), France (EUR), Germany (EUR), Greece (EUR), Hungary (EUR),
Ireland (EUR), Italy (EUR), Japan (EAS), Luxembourg (EUR), Mexico (ROW), Netherlands (EUR),
Poland (EUR), Portugal, Slovak Republic (EUR), South Korea (EAS), Spain (EUR), Sweden (EUR),
Turkey (ROW), United Kingdom (EUR), United States of America (USA), Bulgaria (EUR), Brazil (BRA),
China (CHN), Cypress (EUR), India (IND), Indonesia (ROW), Latvia (EUR), Lithuania (EUR), Malta
(EUR), Romania (EUR), Russia (RUS), Slovenia (EUR), Taiwan (EAS) (for region codes like ROW and
explanations see section 3.2 and Table 2).
7Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Food, Beverages and Tobacco;
Textiles and Textile Products; Wood and Products of Wood and Cork; Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publish-
ing; Chemicals and Chemical Products; Rubber and Plastics; Other Non-Metallic Mineral; Basic Metals
and Fabricated Metal; Machinery, Nec; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment; Manu-
facturing, Nec, Recycling; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Construction; Wholesale Trade and Com-
mission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods; Hotels and Restaurants; Inland Transport; Water Transport;
Air Transport; Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies; Post
and Telecommunications; Financial Intermediation; Real Estate Activities; Renting of M&Eq and Other
Business Activities; Health and Social Work; Other Community, Social and Personal Services. 6 WIOD
sectors with missing data are left out.
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appearing in the estimation are measured in 1995 US-$. Elasticities of substitution are
taken from Koesler and Schymura (2012). They estimate the elasticities with the help of
the WIOD data in a non-linear fashion. Hence, we utilize consistent data and parameter
values throughout the econometric and numerical modeling analysis.
3.2 Estimation results
This subsection discusses the estimation results reported in Table 1. We always report
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The estimated import-related coecient M
can be economically interpreted in the following way: suppose the exogenous growth rate
of a country is 0.02 per year and the import intensity of a specic sector in this country
rises from 0.3 to 0.4, i.e. by 0.1. As a result, the annual productivity growth rate will
increase from 0.02 to 0.02359. The same interpretation applies to the export-related
coecient, albeit the magnitude of this eect is less than half the import-related eect.
The regressions include country-specic xed eects. Anticipating the regional struc-
ture of our modeling exercise in the following section, we aggregate the 40 countries to
eight countries and regions. We aggregate country-specic growth rates by computing
GDP-weighted averages (for the country-region matching see footnote 5). Table 2 depicts
the eight model regions and their resulting estimated aggregate, exogenous annual total
factor productivity growth rates. The results highlight two aspects:
Annual growth rate of total factor productivity
d log

Qrst+1
Zrst+1

Import intensity M
rst
Qrst 
M = 0.0359*** (0.01370)
Export intensity E
rst
Qrst 
E = 0.0160** (0.00777)
F 19.44 (0.0000)
R2 0.0380
Number of observ. 15,678
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 1: Panel estimation for 40 countries, 29 sectors and 15 years including country-
specic xed-eects.
Result 1. The existence of import- and export-driven productivity gains (technology
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Region-specic exogenous annual growth rate of total factor productivity
0r
European Union EUR 0.005
United States of America USA 0.008
Russia RUS 0.014
Brazil BRA 0.000
India IND 0.017
China CHN 0.030
East Asia EAS 0.009
Rest of the World ROW 0.009
Table 2: Aggregated country-specic xed-eects taken from the panel estimation.
spillovers) presumed in our theoretical framework is conrmed by the data.
Both, the coecients of import intensity and export intensity, are statistically sig-
nicant and positive. This implies that importing and exporting are associated with a
positive externality that raises total factor productivity.
Result 2. The strength of trade-related productivity gains is asymmetric: imports entail
higher productivity gains than exports.
This result is in accordance with the econometric literature (referred to in the introduc-
tion to this section) which in most cases focuses on import- (or FDI-) induced technology
spillovers. Consequently, fostering imports will entail higher productivity gains than fos-
tering exports.
Result 3. Taking endogenous trade-induced productivity gains into account, diminishes
the strategically optimal international price ratio by about 5 per cent.
According to (14), the productivity gain factor that diminishes the the strategically
optimal international price ratio can be expressed as prod = 1 
E
1+M
. Inserting the estima-
tions of E and M reported in Table 1, yields the factor prod  0:95.
In accordance with the literature, our results conrm the existence of positive trade-
induced technology spillovers, however, without detecting tremendous eects. Whereas
the literature on technology spillovers focuses on imports, we also take exports into ac-
count in terms of rm selection and increased competition and nd a positive signicant
15
eect. More specically, Hubler and Keller (2009) regress energy intensities of 60 de-
veloping countries between 1975 and 2004 in dlog form on import intensity as in our
specication. They nd a negative, yet insignicant coecient of -0.017 for import inten-
sity (in regression B1, which is most similar to our estimation). This result comes close to
the coecient of 0.016 for total factor productivity (the inverse of factor intensity) that we
nd for export intensity. The coecient for import intensity is more than twice the coe-
cient for export intensity in our results. Hubler and Keller (2009), however, utilize energy
instead of labor intensity, they do not use sectoral data, they include further regressors {
and their results are neither robust across specications nor signicant.
4 Numerical simulation
This section implements the growth mechanism that has been theoretically and econo-
metrically studied in the previous sections in the WIOD computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model. It particularly addresses the propositions derived in section 2. The results
underline the policy-relevance of trade-induced productivity spillovers.
Our trade analysis is related to numerical analyses of trade liberalization as critically
reviewed by Ackerman and Gallagher (2008). The authors conclude that the gains from
free trade have a small magnitude, which is in line with our results. Ackerman and Gal-
lagher highlight the crucial role of Armington (1969) elasticities, which we will also address
in our robustness checks. This literature strand does not take international productivity
spillovers into account, though. International productivity spillovers are considered by
some studies in the eld of development economics. Diao et al. (2005), for example, build
a general equilibrium model in which trade-related international technology spillovers
enhance economic growth. They calibrate this model to the Thai economy. They demon-
strate that protectionism slows down economic growth. Nonetheless, shock liberalization
creates a strong short-run stimulus, but a smaller long-run stimulus. More recently, the
model-based assessment of international climate policy emphasizes the possible role of
international technology spillovers for reducing carbon mitigation costs (e.g. Bosetti et
al., 2008; Leimbach and Baumstark, 2010; Hubler, 2011). This literature overall nds
a signicant, but small inuence of international technology spillovers on climate policy
costs. Yet, this literature strand does not specically deal with trade policy as our analysis
does. Notably, a single distinct approach implements the Melitz (2003) mechanism in a
numerical general equilibrium model (Balistreri et al., 2011; Balistreri and Rutherford,
2012). This approach captures productivity gains through trade and rm selection, but
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not technology spillovers through exporting and importing as our approach does. Bal-
istreri et al. (2011) nd gains from trade liberalization that are four times larger with the
Melitz approach than with the standard Armington approach. Balistreri and Rutherford
(2012) and Boringer et al. (2012) underline that the Melitz mechanism accentuates the
impacts of trade measures (in this case, taris based on carbon intensities of products
known as border carbon adjustment). Like Balistreri et al. (2011), we build our numeri-
cal implementation on theory and an econometric estimation of the parameter values that
we require for parameterizing our theoretical approach.
Whereas benchmark year data for the static calibration are available from sources
like GTAP8, parameter values for the dynamic calibration including the international
spillover mechanism are not directly available. It is a shortcoming of this literature to
apply guesstimated parameter values for the mechanisms of endogenous growth and in-
ternational technology spillovers. Thus, the main advancement of our implementation
compared to the literature is the use of the same mathematical formulation and the same
dataset for the model implementation as for the econometric estimation of the model
parameter values. This guarantees a high precision of the parameterization. The fol-
lowing subsections explain the extended general equilibrium framework and discuss the
simulation results.
4.1 Model setup
This subsection explains the extended model framework. In particular, we implement
Equation (16) of the econometric estimation in a WIOD-data-based CGE model:
Qrs2
Zrs2
=

1 + 0r + M
M rs1
Qrs1
+ E
Ers1
Qrs1

 Q
rs1
Zrs1
(18)
This implies that each sector imports and exports a variety of each good so that we can
calibrate the model to the same real-world data as in the econometric analysis.9 In each
sector, imports and exports create sector-specic productivity gains. For computational
reasons and for a better regional focus, we aggregate the WIOD data set to eight regions
r: Europe, USA, China, India, Brazil, Russia, East Asia (without China) and Rest of the
World. In addition, we aggregate the original 35 WIOD sectors to 18 sectors10 denoted
8Global Trade Analysis Project, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/default.asp.
9In the theoretical model, we followed the classical trade model type and assumed only two sectors
which can either be a net importer or a net exporter.
10Agriculture/forestry/shing, chemicals, construction, coke/petroleum/nuclear, electrical/optical
equipment, electricity/gas/water supply, food/beverages/tobacco, machinery, metals, mining/quarrying,
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by s. We choose 2007 as the benchmark year representing period 1. This means, we
calibrate our model to the global WIOD input-output table for the year 2007.11 Period
2 is generated by expanding each region and sector according to the above equation.
Output Q, imports M , exports E, and inputs Z are endogenous variables resulting from
the general equilibrium of period 1. Notably, the -parameter values are taken from the
econometric estimation in the previous section.
The general equilibrium model ist written in price or marginal-cost form as a mixed
complementarity problem (MCP). It consists of the following elements:
1. Zero-prot conditions:
First, the main production function, dened over all regions and sectors, generates
(nal) goods by using production factors and (intermediate) goods as inputs:
0  Qrst = pQrst   CES
klem
rst fpmrst; CES
kle
rst [CES
kl
rt (p
l
rt; p
k
rt); CES
e
rst(p
e
rst)]g (19)
where  denotes prots, p a price (not a price ratio) and CES a constant elasticity of
substitution function with the arguments in parentheses and the elasticity of substitution
 in the upper index. As before, r denotes regions, s sectors and t time (years). Q
denotes a produced quantity. k signies capital, l labor, e energy and m non-energy
(intermediate) goods, all used as inputs and written in small letters. This condition implies
perfect competition on goods markets. Goods are traded between regions, whereas the
production factors capital and labor are region-specic. Like in the econometric analysis,
the elasticities of substitution are again taken from Koesler and Schymura (2012) who
estimate them with the help of the same WIOD data set. We will apply alternative upper
and lower bound Armington elasticities in a robustness check.
Second, the Armington (1969) trade structure, indicated by a and dened over source
and recipient regions and sectors, aggregates a good produced in various foreign regions to
a bundle and combines it with the corresponding domestically produced good thereafter.
0  arst = parst   CES
a0
s
rst [p
q
rst; CES
as
rst(p
q
rst   r)] (20)
where r signies source regions, whereas r denotes recipient regions. The index em de-
notes that both, non-energy and energy goods, are included. This condition implies that
other non-metallic minerals, other manufacturing/recycling, paper/printing/publishing, services, transport
equipment, textiles, transportation, wood.
11We choose 2007 as a compromise between using the newest data and using data that are not aected
by the economic crisis. Other benchmark years will be discussed in a robustness check.
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no prots exist within the Armington trade domain. Nonetheless, goods produced in dif-
ferent regions are not perfect substitutes; they are distinct varieties. The preference for
each variety is determined by its share in total imports given by the benchmark data.
The sensitivity of this share with respect to (price) shocks is determined by the Arm-
ington elasticity of substitution which is sector-specic. as symbolizes the elasticity of
substitution between imported varieties from dierent regions, whereas a
0
s symbolizes the
elasticity of substitution between the bundle of imported varieties and the domestically
produced variety. As a consequence of the Armington specication, each region has some
extent of (monopolistic) market power on international goods markets. Since the WIOD
data do not contain parameter values for the Armington elasticities, we borrow them from
the GTAP12 7 data. Armington trade has implications for optimal trade policy. Most
notably, product dierentiation by country of origin implies some degree of market power
for all regions (cf. Brown, 1987).
Importantly,  is the ad valorem import tari rate that we will exogenously vary in
our numerical simulations. For the sake of consistency with the theoretical model and of
analytical clarity, we assume the same tari rate for all goods imported to country r.
Third, the consumption function, dened over regions, aggregates non-energy goods
to a bundle and energy goods to another bundle and combines them thereafter:
0  crt = pcrt   CES
cme
rt [CES
cm
rst (p
m
rst); CES
ce
rst (p
e
rst)] (21)
This function denes the representative consumer of each region.
2. Market clearance conditions:
First, domestic production ought to satisfy domestic input demand, Armington export
demand and domestic consumption so that all goods markets clear:
Qrst 
X
s0
@qrs0t
@pqrst
Qrs0t +
X
r
@emrst
@pqrst
Mrst +
@crt
@pqrst
Crt (22)
where Q denotes the output value, M the import value and C consumption as before. s0
signies sectors that demand good s as an intermediate input (s0 and s cover the same set
of sectors so that a specic sector can also receive intermediate inputs from itself), and
r again foreign regions.
12Global Trade Analysis Project, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/
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Second, domestic import demand for each good ought to absorb the supply of this
good by all foreign regions so that all international goods markets clear:
Mrst 
X
r
@emrst
@pemrst
Qrst (23)
Third, an intratemporal condition ensures that the representative consumer of each
region spends his budget fully on consumption:
Crt  Brt
pcrt
(24)
where B denotes the value of the consumer's budget.
3. Budget condition:
The model is closed by imposing a balanced budget condition on each representative
consumer:
Brt = p
l
rt
Lrt + p
k
r
Kr + p
d Dr (25)
where L and K characterize the consumer's endowments with labor and capital. D in-
dicates a xed current account decit (given by the data) associated with the numeraire
price pd = 1.
4.2 Numerical solution
This section rst and foremost illustrates our theoretical ndings for the European econ-
omy. It then examines how these results vary across dierent regions, dierent benchmark
years, dierent Armington elasticities and thus dierent degrees of market power, and dif-
ferent European production sectors. It ends with a short resume.
4.2.1 European trade policy
In our numerical experiment, we rst choose Europe (EUR) in the year 2007 as the
exemplary region r in the spotlight. This means, we exogenously vary the tari  imposed
on Europe's imports. We examine the eect of varying the import tari on Europe's
welfare and identify the optimal tari with endogenous in comparison to exogenous trade-
related technology spillovers to Europe. We also investigate how the other model regions
are aected by the European tari.
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We rst solve a benchmark run without trade policy intervention. Then, we impose
taris at various rates on European imports. In the exogenous spillover scenario, denoted
by ExoSpill, productivity gains are xed at their benchmark run values independent
of changes in imports and exports. In the endogenous spillover scenario, denoted by
EndoSpill, productivity gains are a function of the import and export intensity following
our theoretical and empirical model. Importantly, without policy intervention and thus
without deviations of the trade pattern, both scenarios generate the same benchmark
growth rate between periods one and two. When trade patterns change due to policy
intervention, productivity growth will be unaected in scenario ExoSpill, but will react
in scenario EndoSpill. The propositions formulated in the theoretical part basically
compare a situation where productivity gains depend on imports and exports with a
situation in which they do not. Consequently, the theoretical outcomes can be evaluated
by comparing the scenario EndoSpill with ExoSpill.
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Figure 1: Europe's per mill welfare change in EndoSpill and ExoSpill relative to the
benchmark run without a tari measured within period 2 over various tari rates.
Figure 1 illustrates Europe's per mill welfare change in EndoSpill and in ExoSpill
relative to the benchmark run without a tari, always measured within period 2 and
plotted over various tari rates. The curve has an inverted U-shape which is typical for
optimal tari analysis.
We recall Proposition 2 stating that productivity gains through imports and exports
reduce the optimal tari manipulating the terms of trade in favor of a large open economy.
Figure 1 shows that the optimal, i.e. the welfare-maximizing, tari rate under EndoSpill
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is about 13 percent, whereas the optimal tari rate under ExoSpill is about 16 percent,
which corroborates the proposition.
We recall Proposition 3 stating that there exists a certain strength of productivity
gains from trade such that the incentive to manipulate the terms of trade vanishes. In
our simulations, the spillover strength of exports and imports is given by the econometric
estimates of the previous section based on real-world data. Apparently, the estimated
spillover strength is by far too low to completely enervate the incentive to use a tari for
strategic (terms of trade) reasons.
We recall Proposition 4 stating that the welfare gain for a large open economy achieved
via a given tari rate is lower in the presence of productivity gains through imports and
exports than in their absence. Figure 1 illustrates that the welfare change curve for
EndoSpill always lies below the welfare curve for ExoSpill in accordance with Proposition
2. The maximum welfare gain reached by the optimal tari is about 3.2 per mill under
ExoSpill and only about 2:1 under EndoSpill. This leads us to conclude:
Result 4. The numerical simulations corroborate the relevance and signicance of Propo-
sitions 2 and 4. Optimal taris are always lower when accounting for endogenous produc-
tivity growth. For all taris welfare is lower if endogenous productivity gains are neglected.
How does the optimal European tari aect the other regions' welfare? Table 3 answers
this question by setting the European tari to the optimal rate within scenario ExoSpill
(16 per cent) and thereafter to the optimal rate within scenario EndoSpill (13 per cent)
as depicted by Figure 1. Table 3 reveals the following surprising outcome: the USA
gain from Europe's optimal tari by more than one per mill, whereas the other regions
lose to dierent extents. The USA obviously absorb part of the imports which, previous
to the introduction of the optimal tari, went to Europe and benet from this inverse
trade diversion eect (Lower European imports attenuate world market prices so that the
USA can import at lower prices). Russia as an energy exporter loses up to 15 per mill,
and China up to 9 per mill of welfare due to Europe's tari. India, on the contrary, is
hardly aected by Europe's trade policy. In all cases, the ExoSpill eects with xed
regional productivity growth on the other regions are larger than the EndoSpill eects
with endogenous trade-dependent regional growth. The rst reason is that the optimal
tari under EndoSpill is lower than under ExoSpill so that the trade impacts are smaller.
The second theoretical reason is that Europe can achieve higher productivity growth under
EndoSpill. Consequently, it will demand more imports and produce more (or cheaper)
exports, which is benecial for the other regions. Yet, it is not benecial for the USA
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because they benet from higher, not from lower European trade barriers due to inverse
trade diversion.
Welfare eects of EU trade policy
W r2
ExoSpill EndoSpill
European Union EUR 3.2 2.1
United States of America USA 1.5 1.1
Russia RUS -15.1 -12.8
Brazil BRA -3.6 -3.2
India IND -0.4 -0.6
China CHN -9.2 -7.7
East Asia EAS -2.6 -2.1
Rest of the World ROW -6.8 -6.2
Table 3: Regional welfare eects of Europe's optimal taris under the scenarios ExoSpill
and EndoSpill in period 2 in per mill (compared to the benchmark without taris).
With respect to the magnitude of the eects under scrutiny, it turns out, though, that
the welfare changes have a magnitude of some per mill. This means, the eects under
scrutiny have a limited economic meaning with regard to real-world data. Notably, our
model has only a two-period scope. Some per mill of global GDP accumulated over a
number of years nonetheless generate a substantial welfare eect. The optimal tari rates
themselves are within a realistic range. For comparison: Europe's unweighed average
tari rate on products from the USA was 7.3 per cent in 2007;13 it reached 9.1 per cent
in 1990 and 12.0 per cent in 1995; it declined to 4.6 in 2010. Thus, Europe's computed
optimal tari rates of 13 or 16 per cent are not much above these historical rates.
4.2.2 Region-specic trade policy
We carry out the same tari analysis for the other main model regions, i.e. the United
States and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Figure 2 in the Appendix
puts the European result depicted by Figure 1 in perspective to the corresponding results
for the other model regions. Table 4 summarizes the optimal taris  ropt and corresponding
welfare eectsW r2 for the main model regions. The results are reported for each scenario,
ExoSpill and EndoSpill (compared to the benchmark without taris), and as relative
13UNCTAD, TRAINS data, accessed 07/2013.
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changes of EndoSpill relative to ExoSpill in parentheses.
Region-specic optimal taris and welfare eects
 ropt, W
r2
ExoSpill EndoSpill
 ropt W
r2  ropt W
r2
European Union EUR 16 3.2 13 (-19%) 2.1 (-34%)
United States of America USA 24 4.8 20 (-17%) 3.6 (-25%)
Russia RUS 17 3.6 13 (-24%) 2.3 (-36%)
Brazil BRA 10 1.3 6 (-40%) 0.4 (-69%)
India IND 15 4.0 11 (-27%) 2.4 (-40%)
China CHN 18 12.1 15 (-17%) 8.8 (-27%)
Table 4: Optimal taris  ropt of the main model regions in per cent and the corresponding
welfare aects W r2 in period 2 in per mill under the scenarios ExoSpill and EndoSpill
(compared to the benchmark without taris); relative changes of Endospill relative to
ExoSpill in per cent in parentheses.
All optimal taris are signicantly greater than zero. This outcome is in line with
Brown (1987) who argues that in an Armington specication strong terms-of-trade eects
exist independent of the size model regions. In our results, the United States' optimal
taris and welfare gains are higher than Europe's, but their relative changes between
ExoSpill and EndoSpill is smaller than for Europe. Russia's optimal values and their
changes are slightly higher than Europe's. Brazil's values are relatively small, but the
relative change in welfare and the optimal tari between the scenarios is highest among all
regions. India's optimal taris are lower than Europe's, yet its welfare gains compared to
the baseline are higher; and the relative change in welfare and the optimal tari between
the scenarios is second highest among the regions. Finally, China's optimal taris are
the highest among the regions, whereas the changes in the optimal tari and in welfare
between ExoSpill and EndoSpill is similar to those of the USA and thus relatively low.
Thus, in summary the importance of the optimal tari with and without productivity
spillovers for Europe is lower than in the BRIC countries.
The regional diversity of the results is surprising when considering that we assume the
same strength of trade-induced productivity spillovers for all regions (applying the esti-
mated coecients in Table 1). Thus, country-specic characteristics aect the potential of
endogenous trade-induced productivity gains. They are determined by the input-output
structure including existing productivity levels, the sectoral composition and trade pat-
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terns, and by the exogenous part of the country-specic growth rate as reported by Table
2.
4.2.3 Variation of the benchmark year
It is a strength of WIOD to oer benchmark data for the years 1995 to 2009. We exploit
this strength by calibrating the model to other benchmark years for comparison. Figure
3 in the Appendix shows the outcome for Europe (EUR). Besides the year 2007 (which is
also available in the GTAP14 8 data), we report results for the year 2004 (which is also
available in the GTAP 7 data) and for the most recent available years 2008 and 2009,
which goes beyond GTAP. We report the results in parentheses in the form (optimal
tari in per cent/welfare change with respect to benchmark in per mill under ExoSpill
| optimal tari in per cent/welfare change with respect to benchmark in per mill under
EndoSpill). In 2004, the optimal taris and the corresponding welfare gains for Europe
under ExoSpill and EndoSpill (14/2.3 | 11/1.5) are signicantly smaller than for 2007
(16/3.2 | 13/2.1). In 2008, the optimal taris are the same as in 2007, whereas the welfare
gains are slightly higher (16/3.6 | 13/2.4). In 2009, the values are again smaller (15/2.5
| 11/1.6), similar to the result for 2004. This robustness check demonstrates that the
choice of the benchmark year can play a role, i.e. for some years the results are very similar,
whereas they dier for some other years. This applies in particular to deviations measured
relative to benchmark data, wherein the absolute values of the benchmark data do hardly
matter. Nonetheless, dierent production and trade patterns across benchmark years do
matter for the results. We conclude that in general, the sensitivity of the results to the
choice of the benchmark year is limited and does not aect the qualitative interpretation
of the results. A clear time trend in the benchmark year data is not evident.
4.2.4 Variation of Armington elasticities
In another robustness check, we vary the Armington elasticities (the elasticity of sub-
stitution between foreign varieties as well as between the import bundle and domestic
production taken from GTAP). We refer to Europe calibrated to 2007 data. Higher Arm-
ington elasticities make varieties from dierent countries more similar and reduce market
power. Hence, the optimal taris and the resulting welfare gains decline in higher Arm-
ington elasticities. Figure 2 (e) poses the results for all Armington elasticities set to a
high value of 8, whereas Figure 2 (f) poses the results for all Armington elasticitites set
14Global Trade analysis Project, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v8/
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to a low value of 2. In the high Armington case, the optimal taris and welfare gains
decline substantially to (10/2.6 | 7/1.3). In the low Armington case, the values soar
to (63/17.6 |59/15.9). We conclude that the sensitivity of our results to the choice of
Armington elasticities is high. Moreover, a lower (higher) Armington elasticity represents
lower (higher) substitutability between varieties and thus higher (lower) market power
and vice versa. Against this background, the optimal taris and corresponding welfare
eects rise in market power in accordance with Proposition 1.
Furthermore, we set the Armington elasticities of Europe to a very high value of 25.15
This mimics the situation with almost no power on international markets marked by
Proposition 1. In accordance with the proposition, we nd a negative optimal tari, i.e.
an import subsidy under EndoSpill. The subsidy deteriorates Europe's terms of trade.
This result deviates from Brown (1987) who does not take trade-induced productivity
gains into account.
Result 5. The numerical simulations corroborate Propositions 1 stating that trade-induced
productivity gains can also be exploited without power on international markets to raise
welfare, resulting in a negative optimal tari.
Yet, the import subsidy induces productivity gains that overcompensate the deterio-
ration of the terms of trade. The subsidy rate is with a value of 1 per cent quantitatively
small, though. Likewise, the welfare gain achieved through this optimal subsidy is very
small and hence probably negligible by practical trade policy. In accordance with Propo-
sition 1, in this scenario with almost no market power, an export subsidy is detrimental
for Europe.
4.2.5 European sector-specic results
Finally, we strive for deeper insights into the drivers of the economy-wide eects at the
sector level and for insights into competitiveness eects for European sectors. For this
purpose, Figure 4 in the Appendix plots forgone total factor productivity (total factor
productivity loss) compared to the benchmark run due to reduced European exports and
imports. We run scenario EndoSpill twice: once by setting the tari to its optimal level as
before, and once by setting the tari to the optimal level given by the ExoSpill scenario.
We signify the latter setup by EndoSpill ExoTariff . In EndoSpill ExoTariff , the
tari is set to a rate above the optimal level. Thus, it generates higher forgone total factor
15Perfect substitutes and perfect competition on international markets would require an innite Arm-
ington elasticity, which is not feasible for this type of model.
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productivity than EndoSpill in all sectors as illustrated in Figure 4. These forgone produc-
tivity is solely driven by the trade-induced productivity spillover channel since the tari
rate and all other model parameters are kept constant. Note that the dierence in for-
gone productivity between the two scenarios represents the forgone welfare through trade
policy when not taking into account that trade induces productivity gains. The gure
illustrates that services, construction and electricity/gas/water supply suer the highest
forgone total factor productivity in both scenarios, whereas agriculture/forestry/shing,
mining/quarrying and other non-metallic minerals suer to the smallest extent. Notably,
the economy-wide welfare eect of the trade policies under scrutiny is positive as exam-
ined in the previous analysis, because the government collects the revenues from the taris
and redistributes them to the representative consumer in a lump-sum way and because
the taris shift demand from imports to domestic supply, which is benecial for domestic
producers. These positive eects overcompensate the forgone sectoral factor productivity
(total factor productivity loss) and are not visible in Figure 4.
We relax the assumption of an identical tari on all goods  r to explore the sectoral
dimension in greater detail. A tari  rs specic to sector s is introduced instead. For each
sector s, we calculate the optimal taris EURsopt that maximizes Europe's welfare W
EUR2.
Taris on all goods except for s are xed to zero when determining EURsopt .
The results of these simulations are shown in Table 5. The rst column lists the
18 sectors. Columns 2 to 5 display the sectoral optimal tari EURsopt in per cent and
the corresponding European welfare eects WEUR2 in per mill, both in the ExoSpill and
EndoSpill scenario. The percentage changes in parentheses (6th and 7th column) show the
dierences between the two scenarios in per cent. All further columns display parameters
potentially explaining the results. The Armington elasticity between foreign and domestic
varieties a
0
s , the import and export intensities (
Ms1
Qs1
, E
s1
Qs1
) in per cent, the sectoral size
Qs1
Q1
measured as the share of Europe's total output in per cent, and the share of good s
consumed by nal demand CEURs1CEURs1+QEURs01
in per cent as a measure for the position in
the value chain (higher nal demand share means more downstreamness).
Sectoral optimal taris EURsopt are generally lower than the economy-wide one, which
is EURopt = 16 per cent in the ExoSpill scenario and 
EUR
opt = 13 per cent in the EndoSpill
scenario. Only the optimal tari on textiles is is greater than EURopt in the ExoSpill
scenario, while three sectors exhibit optimal taris above EURopt per cent in the EndoSpill
scenario: food, transport equipment and textiles. The largest welfare gain WEUR2 of
0.7 per mill is achieved by the optimal tari on mining goods. Despite having a high
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Armington elasticity of about a
0
s = 8:5, the mining sector's huge import intensity of 150
per cent allows Europe to exert market power.
The comparison of the chemicals and metals sectors is illuminating. Both account for
about 4 per cent of European production. Chemicals, however, exhibit a higher import
intensity than metals, 15 per cent compared to 13 per cent, and a lower Armington elas-
ticity, 3.3 compared to 3.6. Consequently, sectoral optimal taris are higher for chemicals,
15 per cent compared to 13 per cent in the ExoSpill and 12 per cent compared to 10 per
cent in the EndoSpill scenario. Welfare eects are stronger as well. In the EndoSpill sce-
nario, the welfare gain is 0.19 per mill for chemicals and 0.12 per mill for metals. Without
trade-induced productivity gains, expressed by ExoSpill, the welfare gain is 0.29 per mill
for chemicals and 0.22 for metals.
Accounting for 53 per cent of total production, the services sector is the largest sector
in the European economy. Its Armington elasticity is low (a
0
s = 1:9). Import intensities
are low, too (M
s1
Qs1
= 2:5 per cent). Sectoral optimal taris (5 per cent under ExoSpill and
2 per cent under EndoSpill) as well as the corresponding welfare eects (0.06 per mill in
the ExoSpill and 0.02 per mill in the EndoSpill scenario) are small. Notwithstanding,
services is the sector for which neglecting trade-induced productivity gains is most detri-
mental to Europe's welfare. According to Table 5, considering endogenous trade-induced
productivity gains reduces the sectoral optimal tari by 60 per cent and the welfare gains
by 75 per cent. The economic intuition is that a higher sector size implies that any trade-
induced productivity gain aects a larger part of the economy and thus has a stronger
overall impact on the economy.
In general, optimal taris and welfare gains are always smaller in the presence of
trade-induced productivity gains.16 This conrms both the theoretical results and the
numerical ndings for economy-wide optimal taris  ropt.
When comparing the sectoral optimal taris EURsopt with and without trade-induced
productivity gains, two groups of sectors can be distinguished. One group contains indus-
tries whose optimal taris are reduced by less than 20 per cent. The other one includes all
sectors for which optimal taris fall by 20 per cent or more if productivity spillovers are
taken into account. Dierences in Armington elasticities, import and export intensities,
or sector size provide no obvious explanation for the dierences between sectoral optimal
taris in both scenarios.
Hence, we apply the share of commodity s absorbed CEURs1CEURs1+QEURs1 by nal demand as
16The only exception it the optimal tari on textiles which is identical in both scenarios.
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a measure of the sector's downstreamness. Most sectors for which the dierence between
sectoral optimal taris in the ExoSpill and EndoSpill scenario is 20 per cent or more
exhibit a consumption share of less than 50 per cent. Sectors whose commodities are
absorbed by more than 50 per cent by nal demand mostly exhibit optimal taris falling
by less than 20 per cent if productivity spillovers are considered. The economic intuition is
that more upstreamness implies that any trade-induced productivity gain aects a larger
part of the economy through intermediated goods ows in the production chain and thus
has a stronger overall impact on the economy. The absorption by nal demand, on the
contrary, stops the transmission of productivity gains embodied in intermediate goods
through the economy.
We conclude that trade-induced productivity gains aect optimal taris on upstream
sectors more strongly. Downstream industries benet from increased productivity of in-
termediate suppliers. Restricting trade with intermediate inputs hampers productivity
growth and reduces the productivity of upstream rms, too. Analyzing trade-induced
productivity spillovers along the value chain in detail with more sophisticated measures
of industries' position in production chains (Antras et al., 2012) is beyond the scope of
this paper. It appears to be a fruitful area for future research.
4.2.6 Resume of the numerical analysis
We can summarize the numerical results in general form as follows:
Result 6. A constant given magnitude of trade-induced productivity gains exhibits region-
ally and sectorally diverse optimal taris and induced welfare eects.
This heterogeneity across regions and sectors computed within a complex multi-region,
multi-sector general equilibrium framework extends the pure trade-induced eect found
in our simplied theoretical model in Equation (14) and Result (3). Trade policy that
aims at welfare maximization needs to take this heterogeneity into account. For example,
productivity gains have a stronger impact in larger or more upstream sectors.
The variation of the benchmark year as a small impact on the results (at least when
measuring deviations between the policy scenario and the benchmark scenario in relative
from), whereas the choice of Armington elasticities has a strong impact.
In relation to the literature, our results are in line with studies that examine the inu-
ence of international technology spillovers on climate policy costs (e.g. Bosetti et al., 2008;
Leimbach and Baumstark, 2010; Hubler, 2011). These studies nd a signicant, but small
inuence. Like in Balistreri et al. (2011), the welfare eects of tari variations appear
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small in our analysis. The endogeneity of trade-induced productivity gains does, however,
not as strongly aect the results as in Balistreri et al.'s explicit Melitz implementation.
Though, their analysis is not directly comparable since it does not examine optimal taris
imposed by one region. Importantly, we use a stylized two-period setup so that we merely
capture the trade-induced productivity gains within one period. Running the model over
a long time horizon would result in a much higher cumulated welfare gain. In this respect,
Rutherford and Tarr (2002) simulate a 54-year time horizon. Consequently, they nd an
average welfare gain of ten per cent induced by a ten per cent tari cut, which appears
huge compared to the trade-induced welfare gains of some per mill found in our analysis.
5 Conclusion
Our research explores how endogenous productivity gains from trade aect tari instru-
ments imposed by a large open economy. It builds on a threefold methodological base and
has direct policy implications. It evidences that trade-induced productivity gains exist
which counteract strategic trade policy and which are policy relevant. Our results caution
against the strategic use of taris in order to manipulate the terms of trade. Instead,
they opt for reducing trade barriers, for example in a European Union- United States free
trade agreement, to exploit productivity growth induced by the international exchange of
goods and services.
Markusen (1975) models an environmental externality occurring in the foreign country.
The home country requires market power in order to inuence international prices and
thus to have an impact on the externality abroad. This means, the model requires the large
open economy assumption. This is dierent in our model. The productivity (technology)
spillover externality occurs in the home country. Therefore, the home country has an
incentive to enhance trade in order to magnify the externality even in the absence of
power on international markets. Trade-induced productivity spillovers also dier from the
terms-of-trade eect, which disappears in the absence of market power. The mechanism
scrutinized in our model works under the large open economy as well as the small open
economy assumption.
We estimate the parameters governing the strength of trade-induced productivity
spillovers by applying panel data econometrics. We employ the same dataset that we
use to calibrate the general equilibrium model in the subsequent step. The results show
that imports imply higher productivity gains than exports. The parameter relating import
intensity to productivity growth is more than twice as big as the parameter for export
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intensity. Based on our stylized theoretical model, the optimal tari is reduced by 5 per
cent when taking the endogeneity of trade-induced productivity gains into account.
Our numerical simulations embed the stylized theoretical approach into a more com-
plex and realistic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Whereas all qualitative
results from the theoretical model are conrmed by the simulations, quantitative eects
dier strongly between regions and sectors.
Trade-induced productivity gains are more important for trade policies of the BRIC
countries, especially Brazil and India, than of Europe or the USA. Notably, the European
optimal tari implies welfare gains for the USA, presumably through trade diversion ef-
fects. This nding counteracts expected benets from a European Union - United States
free trade agreement to some extent. Neglecting the endogeneity of trade-induced produc-
tivity gains creates welfare losses. The welfare eects, however, have a small magnitude at
the macroeconomic level. Welfare gains from enhanced trade become particularly small
when the home country's power on international markets is negligible. Trade-induced pro-
ductivity gains increase in existing market power. Note that our study has a two-period
view. When accumulating the growth eects over a longer time horizon, the trade-induced
productivity eects will become larger.
Sectoral optimal taris and their sensitivity with respect to trade-induced productivity
gains are diverse and sometimes have high magnitudes. Trade policy aiming at enhancing
productivity gains may focus on sectors that potentially generate stronger productivity
spillovers. In larger sectors, productivity gains basically generate a stronger eect on the
overall economy than in smaller sectors. Additionally, our results suggest that upstream
sectors are more sensitive to neglecting trade-induced productivity gains, because foregone
productivity spillovers imply cost increases for intermediate inputs by downstream sectors
in addition to cost increases from trade restrictions. Consequently, welfare is reduced more
strongly than when restricting imports of downstream sectors whose goods are mostly
consumed.
Our robustness checks reveal a limited impact of choosing dierent benchmark years
for the model calibration on the results. The reason is that policy impacts are commonly
measured as relative deviations from the benchmark year so that the size of the bench-
mark year economy is of limited importance. Elasticities of substitution between foreign
varieties as well as foreign and domestic varieties (Armington elasticities) have a strong
impact on the results because they determine the degree of market power a country ex-
hibits. Every trade policy analysis carried out with the standard Armington mechanism
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hinges upon these elasticities.
Future research could extent the number of simulation steps over time and the time
frame of the simulations in order to scrutinize scenarios of long-run growth. Exploring the
sectoral dimension of trade-induced productivity gains in more detail is another promising
strand of future research.
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Figure 2: Regional per mill welfare changes in EndoSpill and ExoSpill relative to the
benchmark run without a tari measured within period 2 over various tari rates; note
dierent scales of the vertical axes and for the USA the scale of the horizontal axis; the
depicted regions are (a) Europe, (b) USA, (c) Brazil, (d) Russia, (e) India, (f) China; the
benchmark year is always 2007.
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Figure 3: European per mill welfare change in EndoSpill and ExoSpill relative to the
benchmark run without a tari measured within period 2 over various tari rates; the
dierent benchmark years are (a) 2007, (b) 2004, (c) 2008, (d) 2009, (e) 2007 with all
Armington elasticities set to 8, (f) 2007 with all Armington elasticities set to 2.
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Figure 4: Forgone total factor productivity through taris in European sectors in per cent
under EndoSpill and EndoSpill   ExoTariff relative to the benchmark run without a
tari measured within period 2. EndoSpill applies the optimal tari in the presence of
endogenous spillovers, whereas EndoSpill   ExoTariff applies the optimal tari of the
ExoSpill scenario to the EndoSpill scenario.
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